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The landscape of industrial organization, particularly in the U.S., was for
many years dominated by a bitter struggle between Harvard and Chicago.
Chicago's partisans assumed that rivalry would generally be intense in the
absence of government regulation or effective cartel arrangements. They
accordingly relied on the price theory of Alfred Marshall and, for the
cartel case, Joan Robinson. Harvard's loyalists, on the other hand, assumed
that competition was often seriously imperfect even in the absence of
regulation or cartels. They tended to employ less formal analytical
frameworks derived from the works of Edward Chamberlin and William Fellner.
The differences in the dialects of economics spoken by the two Schools
were such that debates about scientific issues often seemed in need of
translators.1 Empirical work by each school tended to support its basic
assumption about market conduct. Policy prescriptions also reflected those
assumptions. Harvard called for an activist government policy to deal with
serious imperfections in competition, while Chicago, believing that such
imperfections were rare, argued for laissez faire.
In the last two decades the study of industrial organization has been
transformed by rigorous theoretical analyses of imperfect competition.
Graduate courses in industrial organization now cover a host of
sophisticated, game-theoretic models of imperfect competition, some which
have been reviewed in the other chapters in this volume.2 There are no deep
divisions or distinct Schools in this domain; broadly similar theoretical
papers are written and studied at Harvard, Chicago, and other leading
institutions in the U.S. and abroad. The dialect of game theory is spoken
everywhere.
One might expect that this convergence in theoretical method and the
development of a large and widely studied body of theoretical literature
would have served to narrow differences in the empirical and policy domains.
But this does not seem to have happened. Methods and assumptions employed
in empirical work seem if anything more diverse than two decades ago, and
the controversies about basic factual questions that raged then continue
largely unabated now. And, even though distinct Harvard and Chicago Schools
are no longer present in the theoretical literature, defenders of their
traditional positions still dominate many policy debates.
In the remainder of this essay I consider causes and potential cures
for this fragmentation on matters of substance, concentrating on the actual
and potential contribution of empirical studies of rivalrous behavior in
real markets.3 In the next section I argue that theoretical work in
industrial organization has, somewhat paradoxically, made it clear that
empirical research is absolutely critical to progress in this field. The
current fragmentation of the field reflects in large measure the loss of
faith in the two approaches to empirical research - comprehensive industry
case studies and cross-section industry-level profitability studies - that
dominated empirical work in industrial organization until roughly the start
of this decade. These approaches are discussed in Sections 2 and 3,
respectively.
The 1980's have witnessed what Tim Bresnahan and I (1987) have been
incautious enough to call an empirical renaissance in industrial economics.
Compared with the earlier literature, recent research is notable for its
methodological diversity. Sections 4 and 5 discuss some particularly
promising approaches to industry-specific and inter-industry studies,
11
- 3 -
respectively, that figure prominently in recent work. Though the
organization of Sections 2-5 highlights methods used rather than questions
addressed, important empirical findings and problems are discussed as well.
Section 6 briefly summarizes some of the main themes that emerge from this
overview and offers some modest prescriptions.
1. Theory and Empirics
Industrial organization is primarily concerned with the behavior of business
firms in their roles as sellers and with the implications of that behavior
for the operation of markets and the design of public policy. While game-
theoretic tools are well-suited in principle to the analysis of key aspects
of business behavior, their application has neither produced a general
theory of market operation nor given one much reason to expect such a theory
to emerge in the foreseeable future. Under these conditions, empirical
research becomes critical to scientific progress.
The Nature of Recent Theorizing Game theory was developed in large
part to model rational behavior in small numbers situations, and many
industrial markets have only a few important sellers. Indeed, in retrospect
the only surprise is that game theory took forty years to conquer oligopoly
theory. But there is more to the appeal of game theory than this.
Many important aspects of business conduct are inherently dynamic.
Actions and reactions take time; productive assets are often long-lived;
entry and exit decisions turn on before-and-after comparisons. In addition,
information in real markets is rarely complete, perfect, or symmetric.
Potential entrants may know less about a market than established firms, for
instance, and individual established firms may know only their own costs,
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not those of their rivals. Recent advances in extensive form game theory
have greatly facilitated the analysis of situations that involve strategic
behavior over time in settings in which information is incomplete and
asymmetric. There is no comparably attractive approach to the analysis of
such situations anywhere in sight.
Unfortunately, however, the general impression that has emerged from a
decade's extensive use of the game-theoretic approach is "Anything can
happen!" The diversity and growth of the theoretical literatur~e provides a
good deal of support for the conjecture that almost any remotely plausible
pattern of conduct -- anything that has ever been alleged with a straight
face in an antitrust case, say -- can appear in an equilibrium in an
apparently plausible game-theoretic model. Policy implications are in some
sense even more varied, since efficient policy in many models depends on
details of parameter values and functional forms.
This situation flows from two apparently general features of game-
theoretic models of market behavior.4 The first is that many apparently
simple multi-period games of incomplete information have multiple
equilibria -- often an uncountable infinity of equilibria. Though
considerable work has been done to refine the definition of equilibrium in
order to mitigate this problem, it still remains endemic. Current practice
often involves selecting a single equilibrium on the basis of model-specific
plausibility arguments. Sometimes these arguments are compelling; in other
cases "anything can happen" is the only way to summarize the multitude of a
single model's equilibria.
Even game-theoretic models that have unique equilibria possess a
second feature that is in some respects even more troubling: the
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predictions of game-theoretic models seem delicate and are often difficult
to test. Important qualitative features of equilibria often depend
critically on whether prices or quantities are choice variables, on whether
discrete or continuous time is assumed, on whether moves are sequential or
simultaneous, and, perhaps most disturbing of all, on how players with
incomplete information are assumed to alter their beliefs in response to
events that do not occur in equilibrium. When information is incomplete,
strategies depend on unobservable beliefs, and the often empirically
questionable assumption that key parameters and probability distributions
are common knowledge is frequently central to the analysis. The level of
rationality required of actors in many game-theoretic models seems to exceed
the capabilities of all but the best economic theorists.
Thus game-theoretic modeling has taught us a great deal about what
might happen in a variety of situations, but relatively little about what
must happen conditional on observables. Game theory has proven better at
generating internally consistent scenarios than at providing plausible and
testable restrictions on real behavior. It seems almost certain that the
theoretical literature contains a sizeable number of what Clapham (1922)
called "empty boxes" - internally consistent models that describe no real
markets - and that more such boxes are being constructed daily. But there
is no consensus on which models belong to this class and which others should
be taken particularly seriously because their predictions are often correct.
Thus disputes about issues of fact and policy can and do flourish despite an
impressive array of theoretical results and insights.
Moreover, the very diversity of predictions in the theoretical
literature seems to cast doubt on the value of theory in this field. The
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sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes to modeling details seems to suggest
that one must know more than anyone is likely ever to know about any real
market in order to use theory to make definite predictions about conduct and
performance.
The Roles of Empirical Research Absent a theoretical breakthrough, it
seems clear that only empirical research can alter this state of affairs,
since only empirical testing can definitively establish the domain of
applicability of any model. This is the most-cited role of empirical
research in this or any field: testing theories in a variety of settings to
see under what conditions, if any, their predictions are valid. Because
most of the theoretical literature in industrial organization remains
untested in this sense, theorists are free to generalize, extend, innovate,
and explore with essentially no external constraints.
Game-theoretic models are particularly hard to test, since their
predictions are sensitive to market details it is often difficult or (in the
case of models in which beliefs and expectations play a critical role)
impossible to observe. But, as Friedman (1953) stressed, predictions are
ultimately what matters. That is, in situations in which a model's
assumptions are at least plausible (Friedman might argue against this
condition), one can concentrate on confronting its predictions with the
facts. The domain of any model's applicability can then be determined by
analysis of the similarities and differences between and among situations in
which it does and does not perform well.
While most general discussions of empirical research stress theory
testing, such research also has two other critical roles to play in
industrial organization. The first is simply to provide facts with which
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theories must be consistent. Tests that reject widely accepted theories or
indicate that they have a narrow range of validity yield such facts
automatically, of course. But empirical studies not primarily aimed at
theory testing may also play this role. Early astronomers aimed simply to
describe the heavens; their results on the movements of the planets provided
key facts in the development of theories of gravitation.
Unfortunately, few theories are ever conclusively rejected in
economics. And the low value placed on descriptive research by much of the
economics profession depresses the volume of such research. Industrial
organization theorists thus confront a relatively small fact base and are
free to build models that relate to no well-described real market, since few
markets are in fact well-described.
The third role of empirical research in industrial organization is to
inform the analysis of particular industries and the design of general
policy rules by providing information on the frequency with which particular
market structures and patterns of conduct occur in the economy. If, for
instance, predatory pricing never occurs, the ideal policy is to ignore
charges of predation, since any other policy can only waste resources. This
is in many respects the hardest of the three roles. We have concentration
ratios for most manufacturing markets in many economies, for instance, but
little comprehensive information is available on more subtle aspects of
market structure, and essentially no systematic data aside from accounting
profit rates is available on conduct or performance. This leaves a factual
vacuum in policy debates that is quickly filled by beliefs and assumptions.
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2. Classical Industry Case Studies
Industry-level case studies were central to the research program of the
Harvard School when it emerged under the leadership of Edward Mason and
others in the 1930's. Lacking a satisfactory theory of business behavior in
concentrated, dynamic markets with incomplete information, these scholars
initially hoped to develop useful generalizations inductively by carefully
examining structure, conduct, and performance in many markets. These
examinations tended to be reported in comprehensive, book-length studies;
see Wallace (1937) for an early and influential study of the aluminum
industry and Peck (1961) for an interesting follow-up.
These studies tended to be qualitative and historical in nature and to
emphasize the evolution of market structure and patterns of behavior over
time. Since such work required both broad and deep information, case
studies written in the U.S. often relied on data and documents collected and
made public in the course of antitrust cases. Thus concentrated industries
that seemed, at least to antitrust authorities, to behave non-competitively
tended to be over-represented in the case study literature.
The best of these early industry studies summarized mountains of
documents and testimony into a consistent and generally persuasive picture.
They regularly described patterns of conduct that were not easily explained
by simple competitive or monopoly models. Studies of the interwar U.S.
cigarette industry by Tennant (1950) and Nicholls (1951), for instance,
found an early period of differing and frequently changed prices, followed
by a long period of price leadership, during which list prices were
identical and only rarely changed. 5 Rivalry apparently shifted to
advertising and away from price early in this second period.6
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This single data point was highly influential. It showed clearly the
limits of both competitive and monopoly models, and it drew attention to the
phenomena of price leadership, price rigidity, and shifts from price to non-
price rivalry as industries matured. In addition to specific observations
of this sort, classical case studies helped to shape the world views of
several generations of scholars by providing a wealth of detailed
qualitative information about business decision-making and its effects.
The production of high-quality comprehensive industry studies seems to
have peaked around 1960. It may have become increasingly clear that the
Harvard School's inductive research program, like recent theoretical
research, was better at generating interesting examples and observations
than useful general rules. Moreover, comprehensive case studies were time-
consuming, often involved a great deal of subjective judgement, and tended
to cover only a small, non-representative sample of industries for which
usually private data had been made public. Systematic comparative
evaluations of case studies were difficult because the individual studies
were not easily summarized. And an alternative approach had become
increasingly attractive.
3. Classical Cross-Section Studies
Joe Bain's (1951, 1956) seminal inter-industry cross-section profitability
studies were based on the deceptively simple observation that the effective
exercise of monopoly power should on average yield monopoly profits. The
statistical analysis of profitability differences among large samples of
markets thus seemed to promise rapid and objective development of general
relationships regarding the incidence of monopolistic behavior.
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Bain's own work was marked by extremely careful development of
quantitative data based on detailed qualitative knowledge of the markets in
his samples. Perhaps because few could confidently imitate this style or
because multiple regression analysis was not routine in the 1950's, few
scholars followed Bain's lead initially. But, as computation costs fell and
government-supplied industry-level data became more widely available, the
journals began to fill with cross-section profitability studies in the
1960's, and the production of comprehensive industry studies waned.
Much cross-section research focused on Bain's (1951) original
hypothesis: effective collusion, and thus supra-competitive profitability,
are more likely when concentration is high. Over time, more effort was
devoted to following Bain's (1956) later work and considering the effects of
entry conditions.7 Most early studies tended to support the existence of a
positive relation between concentration and profitability, though that
relation was often statistically fragile and economically weak. And a
number of variables that arguably proxied for the difficulty of entry were
also positively related to profitability; some of these relations (notably
that involving the advertising-sales ratio) were quite robust.
But during the 1970's critics of this general approach became vocal and
persuasive, and a number of empirical anomalies were uncovered. As a
result, relatively few scholars at the start of this decade believed that
the industry-level cross-section literature had shed much light on the
structural determinants of non-competitive behavior.
Measurement Problems The design of Bain's (1951) original study and
many that followed involved comparing seller profitability and
concentration in a sample of manufacturing markets. The first critics of
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this approach argued that neither concentration nor profitability could be
observed accurately in practice. As the specifications of cross-section
models became more complex and as the theoretical literature developed,
additional measurement problems became apparent.
Bain had first to decide what collections of products and regions for
which data were available constituted economic markets. This is often not a
simple task even when detailed data are available, as any antitrust veteran
will testify. Then Bain had to decide how to measure concentration. He
chose the total market share of the eight largest sellers, which later work
has shown to be highly, though not perfectly correlated with alternative
plausible measures.
Finally, Bain had to decide how to measure seller profitability. He
chose to use the average ratio of accounting profits to the balance sheet
value of net worth (or owners' equity) for the firms in each market for
which he was able to collect data. Unfortunately, it is by now well-known
that accounting measures of the rate of return on assets or net worth are at
best noisy measures of firms' true, economic rates of return. Conventional
accounting systems treat inflation and depreciation improperly (Fisher and
McGowan (1983)), and accounting practices vary among firms and over time.
Some authors have sought to avoid capital-related accounting biases by
using the so-called price-cost margin: (revenue - labor and materials
cost)/revenue. But this measure has little theoretical or empirical support
(Liebowitz (1982)); radically different values of the price-cost margin can
yield identical rates of return on owners' investment when capital
intensities differ. Recently a number of authors have used Tobin's q, the
ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets, as a
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measure of profitability (Salinger (1984)). But the measurement of
replacement cost inevitably relies critically on accounting data.
Even if accounting data were not inherently noisy, most large modern
firms sell in multiple markets and have assets and expenses that are not
easily allocated among those markets. Even though his data were from the
1930's, when diversification was less of a problem than today, Bain was thus
required to define some of his markets broadly (e.g., aluminum products) so
as to include most of his firms' revenues. Today, firm-level data are
rarely used for market-oriented cross-section studies unless product mix
information can be used to construct weighted averages of the features of
the markets in which each firm sells.
Many cross-section profitability studies attempt to avoid the
diversification problem by using data for individual plants or business
units. Since plants' outputs are typically more homogeneous than firms', it
is more frequently plausible to assign plants to particular markets than to
assign entire firms. But data derived in this fashion, like those in the
U.S. Census of Manufactures, omit costs that are not incurred at the plant
level and tend to force the use of measures, like the price-cost margin,
that ignore capital costs. The obvious alternative is to use data in which
firms themselves have allocated costs to each of the markets from which they
receive revenue; the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business data
(Ravenscraft (1983)) and the PIMS data set of the Strategic Planning
Institute provide frequently-employed examples. The obvious danger here is
that cost allocations are inevitably somewhat arbitrary.
Early defenders of the cross-section approach (e.g., Weiss (1971)) had
a ready reply to attacks based on measurement error. They noted that as
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long as measurement errors are random, they tend to mask true relations, not
exaggerate them. Thus rather than indicting the whole cross-section
approach, measurement errors provide an excuse for the weak results it
frequently produces.
But the argument does not end there. Random measurement errors should
cause the variance of accounting rates of return to exceed that of real,
economic rates of return. And a number of authors (e.g., Alberts (1984) and
Salinger (1984)) have observed that differences among accounting measures of
firm profitability in the U.S. are generally too small to be easily
reconciled with the existence of much monopoly power in the economy, even if
measurement error is assumed away.8 That is, even if accounting profit
measures were exact and perfectly correlated with concentration, the
estimated effect of concentration on market performance would be small. The
real effect, if any, must be even smaller because of measurement error.
Data on after-tax returns on equity from Bain's (1951) original study
illustrate this point nicely. Suppose the competitive value of this measure
of profitability is rc. Then if r is the after-tax rate of return on equity
for some firm exercising monopoly power, we must have
(1) r - r - (1-r)(R-C) [(l-r)R] [R-C]
c E E '
where r is the corporate tax rate, R is revenue, C is total cost (including
normal profit), and E is owners' equity. A plausible estimate of rc is the
average after-tax rate of return on equity in Bain's 20 unconcentrated
industries: 6.9%. It appears that [(l-r)R/E] averages about 1.12 for the
firms in Bain's sample.9 Thus an observed r of 16% corresponds to a markup
over total cost [(R-C)/R] of about 8.1% (16.0 - 6.9)/1.12], which would be
1__ 111_--- 1- --·--_1_- __1____1___1_1_.___._·.
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chosen by a monopoly facing a demand elasticity of about 12. Such a high
demand elasticity implies little monopoly power, yet only 3 of Bain's 22
concentrated industries had r's above 16%.
Bain's data also illustrate the general weakness of estimated
concentration/profitability relations. Using this same approach, the
average r in his preferred sample of concentrated industries corresponds to
a demand elasticity of about 22. For other samples (see his Table 3),
implied elasticities range from 31 to 111, and the corresponding
profitability differences are generally insignificant.
Studies that went beyond concentration to consider conditions of entry
encountered yet another layer of measurement problems. Bain (1956)
performed small-scale case studies for each industry in his sample and
assessed barriers to entry judgmentally. Since entry will eliminate excess
profits in the absence of barriers, Bain tested - and found some support
for - an interactive hypothesis: profits are high only when both
concentration and barriers to entry are high.
Later authors generally eschewed both Bain's labor-intensive and
inherently subjective measurement approach and his theoretically plausible
interactive specification.l 0 Following the influential work of Comanor and
Wilson (1967), most studies employed additive regression models in which
both concentration and proxies for entry barriers appear as independent
variables. Not only are additive specifications suspect on a priori
grounds, but it is unclear that commonly-employed proxies, such as the
market share of a medium-sized plant and the advertising/sales ratio,
measure conditions of entry at all well. The theoretical literature
suggests that other factors that are more resistant to measurement, such as
III
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information structures and the extent to which costs are sunk, are at least
as important as scale economies. And the theoretical links between the
advertising intensities of established firms, which clearly depend heavily
on difficult-to-quantify features of the product involved, and entry
conditions is tenuous at best.
It is perhaps not surprising in light of the discussion of Bain (1951)
above that when variables intended to proxy for conditions of entry and
other elements of market structure are added to cross-section profitability
regressions, the coefficient of concentration is often negative or
insignificant (e.g., Comanor and Wilson (1967), Porter (1976)).
Identification Problems A later and ultimately more potent stream of
criticism began with Demsetz's (1973) argument that profitability and
concentration could be positively correlated in cross-section even if
concentration had no effect on the intensity of rivalry. His argument
relied on inter-firm differences and pointed toward the endogeneity of
concentration, two key themes in much recent research.
Since the standard presumption is that cross-section studies aim to
reveal differences among long-run equilibria, Demsetz's argument is most
naturally illustrated in that context.11 It is then plausible to let
quantity (which one can think of as capacity) be the strategic variable and
assume constant returns to scale. Thus consider a homogeneous-product
industry in which firm i's constant long-run unit cost is ci. Then if P(Q)
is the industry inverse demand function, qi is firm i's output, and qi - Q -
qi is the output of firm i's rivals, firm i's economic profit is given by
(2) ri - [P(qi+qi) - i]qi.
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The first-order condition for maximizing i can be written as follows:
(3) (P - i) = - qiP' (1+Xi) - Si(l+Xi)P,
where Si = qi/Q is firm i's market share, = -P'Q/P is the reciprocal of
the (absolute value of) the industry elasticity of demand, and Ai = dqi/dqi
is firm i's conjectural derivative.
Game theorists tend to become apoplectic at the sight of quantities
like i, since they do not appear in game-theoretic equilibria. I use
conjectural derivatives here, as they are used in much recent industry-
specific work (following Iwata (1974)), to summarize conduct that may in
fact be an imperfectly collusive equilibrium of a complex game played by
real oligopolists. Generally, higher values of conjectural derivatives
-describe less intense rivalry: all else equal, the higher is Ai, the lower
is firm i's output and the larger is the gap between price and its marginal
cost.
Continuing the development above, substitution of (3) into (2) yields
(4) X i - n(l+Ai)(Pqi)Si.
Firm i's accounting profit (neglecting accounting errors) will equal i plus
pki, where p is the relevant competitive rate of return and ki is the value
of firm i's equilibrium capital stock. Adding pki to both sides of (4) and
dividing by ki, we obtain an expression for firm i's accounting rate of
return on assets:
r i p + [(l+i)]viS i ,(5)
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where vi Pqi/ki is the reciprocal of firm i's observed capital/output
ratio. In this model, firms with lower costs tend as a consequence to have
higher market shares and higher rates of return.
Finally, if Ai - A and vi - v for all firms in the industry,1 2 the
industry's average accounting rate of return is given by an Si-weighted
average of the ri:
(6) r = p + [(l+A)v]H,
where H Z(Si)2 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of seller
concentration. The greater are the differences among the ci, the larger
will be H in this framework; concentration is endogenous in long-run
equilibria.
Equation (6) directly rationalizes Demsetz's (1973) assertions: even if
the intensity of rivalry, measured here by A, does not vary among
industries, equation (6) predicts a positive correlation between
concentration and profitability in cross-section. Random inter-industry
differences in and v could easily account for the general weakness of that
correlation in practice. This view of the world cannot be distinguished
from that of Bain in industry-level cross-sections. Many recent authors
have accordingly turned to the analysis of intra-industry differences
between firms, I discuss some of this work in Section 5.
It is important to note that endogeneity problems of this sort are
ubiquitous in cross-section studies in industrial organization. Such
studies can at best detect differences among long-run equilibria. But
essentially all observable quantities in any market are determined by what
Scherer (1980, ch. 1) has called the market's basic conditions (particularly
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the nature of the product and the available technologies for production and
marketing) and by business strategies, government policies, and historical
accidents. Not only are basic conditions difficult to observe and quantify,
but they too are endogenous in the long run as firms invest in product and
process innovation.
This argument casts considerable doubt on the ability of cross-section
studies in general to reveal structural relations. Consider, for instance,
the strong positive cross-section relation between industry advertising-
sales ratios and profitability first detected by Comanor and Wilson (1967)
and subsequently found by numerous other authors. Even if this relation is
not an accounting artifact, reflecting merely the failure to treat
advertising with long-lived effects as an investment, it surely cannot be
structural. If it were, it would imply that colluding firms could always
increase their profits by increasing their advertising budgets, and this is
most implausible. In this case, and in others, cross-section studies are
best understood as revealing descriptive relations among endogenous
variables. Such relations can be informative, but they must be interpreted
with considerable care in light of the generally unobservable differences in
exogenous variables that they reflect.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is some tension between the
weak and inconclusive results of industry-level cross-section analyses and
the fairly stark picture painted by many case studies. The latter show
many apparent instances of non-competitive behavior in concentrated
industries; the former find relatively little evidence that concentrated
industries earn monopoly profit. This suggests that profits are often
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eroded by forces other than rivalry among established firms. I discuss this
suggestion further below.
4. Econometric Industry Studies
The discussion so far indicates that substantive progress in industrial
organization depends critically on the productive use of non-classical
approaches to empirical research. And a number of promising methods of this
sort have been developed - some recently and some during the heyday of
classical cross-section profitability studies. I begin here with promising
approaches to the analysis of individual industries and then consider inter-
industry analysis in Section 5.
In recent years a number of authors have begun to heed Leonard Weiss's
(1971, p. 398) call to go "back to the industry study, but this time with
regression in hand." By focusing on a single industry, they can control for
the unobservable differences basic conditions that often plague the
interpretation of cross-section studies. This focus of course also means
that no single study can yield more than one observation on the industries
that make up the economy. But many scholars have learned from the history
of cross-section profitability regressions that it is better to understand
one industry well than to collect difficult-to-interpret data on many.
By exploiting econometric techniques that were in large part
unavailable to the authors of the classic industry studies discussed in
Section 2, scholars today can exploit more fully the information in
available data. In some studies, which I discuss first, this information
comes from differences among separated markets in the same industry; in
others the useful variations occur over time in a single market.
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Inter-Market Variation An early exemplar of this line of research is
Benham's (1972) study of the advertising of eyeglasses. Benham observed
that some states in the U.S. made it illegal for eyeglass vendors to
advertise, while others barred only advertising that mentioned prices, and
still others had no restrictions at all. Benham gathered data on prices
charged for eyeglasses in various states and found that the more severe were
advertising restrictions, the higher were prices on average. This does not
prove that advertising tends to increase rivalry in all settings, of course,
though it does seem to indicate that it can do so under some conditions --
most plausibly by reducing consumers' search costs.
A number of authors have reacted to the difficultly of measuring
profitability and studied the relation between price and concentration in
geographically separated markets, often with proxy variables for cost
differences inserted as controls. Cotterill's (1986) study of supermarket
pricing in Vermont towns provides a recent example. Most studies of this
sort find seller concentration to be positively related to price. This
work thus seems to provide relatively strong support for a link between
concentration and collusion, since Demsetz's arguments would associate
concentration with efficiency and thus with low prices. But the sources of
spatial variations in concentration have not been systematically explored.
And both trivial and substantial concentration effects have been detected,
suggesting that the concentration-collusion relation, if any, has a
substantial product-specific dimension.
In an interesting recent variation on this general theme, Bresnahan and
Reiss (1987) study the number of retail establishments of various types
(including veterinarians, beauty parlors, and movie theaters) operating in a
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set of small, isolated U.S. towns. For each type of establishment, they
basically estimate two parameters: Pl, the minimum population at which a
single firm enters, and P2, the minimum population at which a second firm
appears. If (P2/P1) is approximately 2, entrants into one-firm markets
must expect monopoly pricing to continue after their entry; values of
(P2/P1) much above 2 indicate less favorable post-entry expectations and are
thus consistent with entry deterrence. Bresnahan and Reiss find a good deal
of variation in this ratio; they wisely resist the temptation to explore
possible sources of inter-industry differences in their small sample.
Finally, Bresnahan (1987) uses quality differences to identify year-
specific inter-market variation within the U.S. automobile industry. He
employs a model of vertical product differentiation, which implies that
small changes in the price of any one model of automobile affect only the
two models with "adjacent" quality levels. Because rivalry is thus
localized along the quality spectrum, the overall auto market can be
decomposed into a set of linked submarkets. Estimated relations between
pricing behavior and the identities of the participants in each submarket
can then be used to test hypotheses about firm behavior. Bresnahan cannot
reject collusive behavior in 1954 and 1956; he cannot reject competitive
behavior for the boom year of 1955.
Intertemporal Variation A number of studies have analyzed changes in
market behavior following some arguably exogenous event, often related to
government policy. Rose (1987), for instance, compares the U.S. trucking
industry before and after deregulation and finds strong evidence that labor
unions captured a large fraction of the rents created by regulatory
restrictions on competition. Such rent-sharing seems generally plausible a
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priori, and it may account at least in part for the generally small inter-
industry variations in profitability discussed in Section 3. But it has
proven hard to detect rent-sharing in many inter-industry studies, in part
because concentration and unionization are highly correlated in U.S. cross-
sections.13
Mergers naturally lend themselves to before-and-after analyses of this
sort, and a large literature on the effects of mergers has emerged in recent
years. Barton and Sherman (1984), for instance, studied a merger that
substantially increased concentration and found that prices rose sharply
after it was consummated. Many authors have found that acquired firms'
shareholders generally benefit from mergers. Eckbo (1985) found that
horizontal mergers also tend to benefit shareholders of rival firms. This
finding might suggest that horizontal mergers tend to increase the
likelihood of collusive behavior, but Eckbo's finding that rival firms'
stock price increases were unrelated to the level of or change in seller
concentration indicates that something more than a simple concentration-
collusion relation is at work.
Many authors have recently used variations in behavior over time in
periods without clearly significant exogenous events to measure the extent
to which monopoly power is being exercised.1 4 Their studies are the most
direct descendants of the classical industry studies discussed in Section 2.
This research involves a particularly heavy investment in data set
construction and in developing modeling strategies tailored to available
industry-specific data. Accordingly, a large number of techniques for
econometric industry analysis have been developed, but most have been
employed only once or twice.
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Lieberman's (1987) analysis of capacity expansion decisions in chemical
process industries is an interesting, though somewhat atypical example of
this general approach. Because of scale economies, new capacity in these
industries is generally added in sizeable lumps, typically after a period of
high utilization of existing capacity. Lieberman looks for significant
differences between the decision rules used by established firms to add
capacity and those used by new entrants, and he finds none. This finding
casts doubt on the empirical validity of the many models in which
overinvestment in capacity is used to deter entry. Slade's (1987) use of
daily gasoline station price data (along with daily data on the wholesale
price of gasoline) to estimate reaction functions provides another recent
example of the direct estimation of firm decision rules.
Many recent econometric industry studies rely on variants of the
static first-order condition written above as equation (3):
(7) Pi - MCi + [(l+Ai)Pi]qi,
where MCi replaces ci to emphasize that marginal cost is what matters, and
Pi replaces P because different firms may charge different prices when
products are differentiated. If sufficient time-series data on cost and
demand conditions are available, one can use this relation to estimate or
test hypotheses about the intensity of rivalry, measured here by Ai.
In an influential early paper, Iwata (1974) studied a homogeneous-
product industry and used estimates of the industry demand function and
accounting estimates of firm-specific marginal costs to estimate conjectural
derivatives. Most subsequent authors have avoided accounting estimates of
marginal cost and have instead used data on its determinants. These
1 _m 
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usually include input prices and capacity utilization, though Ashenfelter
and Sullivan (1987) employ data on changes in state-specific cigarette taxes
to construct (non-parametric) tests on A.
Baker and Bresnahan (1985) observe in effect that (7) implies that a
firm with market power will price according to
(8) (Pi - MCi)/Pi - (l+Ai)Pqi/Pi - 1/i,
where the last equality defines g, firm i's net or residual elasticity of
demand. This quantity measures the sensitivity of firm i's demand to
changes in its price, taking into account the expected responses of i's
rivals. Assuming expectations are on average correct, Baker and Bresnahan
show how to use data on demand and on firm-specific determinants of marginal
cost to obtain estimates of firm-specific residual demand elasticities - and
thus of markups over marginal cost.
As Bresnahan (1988) notes, econometric industry studies generally
reject competitive hypotheses in favor of alternatives involving less
intense rivalry. Like the classical industry studies discussed in Section
2, this work often relies on data made public in antitrust proceedings. It
is thus perhaps no great surprise that non-competitive behavior is
frequently detected. And, and I noted in Section 3, profit rates do not
appear to be extraordinarily high in many industries in which price is found
to be well above marginal cost. Thus the results of econometric industry
studies do not serve to rule out Chamberlinian monopolistic competition or
other models in which entry or inflated fixed costs eliminates potential
monopoly profits.
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Recent work by Hall (1987) illustrates both the potential value of
time series data in industrial organization and a potential pitfall in their
analysis. Suppose that capital is fixed in the short run and that a firm's
production function is simply Q - vL, where v is a constant and L is labor
input.1 5 If w is the wage rate, it follows that short-run marginal cost is
equal to w/v. Suppose that the firm sets price, P, equal to times
marginal cost, where is a constant. Taking first differences in the
production function then yields
(10) AQ AL [ 1L Lp] -,L
where the last expression follows because P - w/v. Since all quantities in
(9) except 0 are observable, simple time-series regressions can be used to
estimate 0. And, since labor productivity is observed to vary pro-
cyclically (Q/L rises when L rises and falls when it falls) and labor's
share of revenue (wL/PQ) is less than one, Hall's estimates of are
generally well above unity for two-digit U.S. industries.
Hall's analysis rests on a static model of firm conduct. In fact, as
Carlton (1986) and others have noted, prices tend to be rigid over time,
particularly in concentrated industries. Rotemberg and Summers (1988) argue
that price rigidity and the related practice of labor hoarding (workforce
rigidity) can produce procyclical variations in labor productivity in
competitive industries. It would seem that dynamic models of the firm
should be used to analyze changes in business behavior over time; the
traditional cross-section assumption of long-run equilibrium may be highly
misleading in a time-series context.
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5. Inter-Industry Studies
Even though cross-section industry-level profitability studies are still out
of fashion, studies comparing multiple industries appear regularly in
leading journals. Only this sort of research can directly reveal patterns
that hold for the economy as a whole. A hallmark of recent inter-industry
research is the development of data sets that contain information not
present in the industry-level cross-sections on which the bulk of the
earlier literature was based. As in Section 4, the discussion here is
organized around the sources of that information.
International Differences Comparisons between the same industry in
countries at a similar stage in development hold basic conditions of
products and available technologies at least approximately constant.1 6 The
best-known example of this sort of study may still be Pryor's (1972)
comparison of concentration ratios in manufacturing industries. Pryor
found that rank correlations of these ratios among industrialized nations
were high, suggesting the importance of basic conditions -- as opposed to
business strategies, government policies, and historical accidents -- as
determinants of concentration. Moreover, he found that concentration did
not tend to decline noticeably with the size of the national market except
for very small nations; for one reason or another, larger countries tend to
have larger firms. (See Scherer, et al (1975) for more on this.)
Several Canadian and U.S. scholars have taken advantage of language
and geography and studied correlates of differences between Canadian
manufacturing industries and their U.S. counterparts. The comprehensive
study by Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980) is an important example of this
strand of research.
III
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Survey and Interview Data Perhaps because economists tend to compare
themselves with natural scientists, particularly physicists, most economic
research in recent years has been based entirely on data about what firms
and households actually do in the market, rather than on direct measures of
attitudes, information, and beliefs. Most econometric industry studies, for
instance, eschew reliance on the qualitative documentary information and
testimony that were key data for the authors of the classic industry
studies.
To some extent this practice reflects a belief, not present in the
other social and behavioral sciences, that one can learn about people only
by observing their actions, not by asking them questions. The result is
that no information at all is obtained regarding the likely outcomes of
experiments that nature does not perform, and variables that are not
captured by conventional accounting systems or directly reflected in
securities prices are not measured. Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining
comparable numerical data over long periods tends to discourage work on the
evolution of market structure on conduct, themes that were central to the
classic case studies.
Some very interesting inter-industry work has been produced by setting
these prejudices aside. There is a long tradition of "engineering" studies
of scale economies, which are essentially based on structured interview;
Scherer, et al (1975) is a leading example. This research aims to map out
the features of best-practice technology directly, rather than trying to
infer it from numerical data on plants of various (typically unknown)
vintages and scales.
III
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Porter's (1976) work on the influence of retailer behavior on market
performance gives an example of the potential value of judgmental
classifications of industries - in the tradition of Bain (1956). Porter
made use of common sense and information about distribution channels to
divide consumer products into "shopping goods," for which retailers are an
important source of information, and "convenience goods," which retailers
simply make available. Estimation of standard cross-section profitability
equations produced very different results in these two samples, suggesting,
consistent with recent theory, that information transmission mechanisms are
important for market performance.
Most recently, Levin, et al (1987) conducted a large survey study aimed
at detecting, among other things, what factors prevent rapid imitation from
dissipating the rewards to innovation. Their findings that patents are
unimportant in this regard in many industries and that the important factors
vary considerably from industry to industry have a number of implications
for theoretical and empirical research on technical change.
Intra-Industry Differences As Section 3 noted, Demsetz's (1973)
critique of the classical interpretation of cross-section profitability
regressions focused attention on differences among rival firms. The first
studies of these differences seemed strongly to favor Demsetz's position.
Porter (1979) found (as had Bain (1951)) that the profitability of leading
firms was positively correlated with concentration, but the profitability of
firms with small market shares was not.1 7 Ravenscraft (1983) included both
concentration and market share in equations designed to explain business
unit profitability. He and a number of later authors found that the
- 29
coefficient of market share was positive and significant in such
regressions, while the coefficient of concentration was not.
Later studies that looked more closely at the inter-industry pattern of
intra-industry differences produced less clear-cut results. A number of
authors found that the intra-industry relation between profitability and
market share on which Demsetz's argument seemed to rest was not particularly
strong in many cases. Schmalensee (1987a) estimated equation (5) for a
matched sample of U.S. manufacturing industries in 1963 and 1972 and
replicated this finding. He then studied the inter-industry differences in
the estimated coefficients and found little support for simple models of
either the Bain or Demsetz variety. He did detect, as had several other
authors, a positive cross-section relation between the coefficient of market
share in (5) and the industry advertising-sales ratio. A possible
explanation for these mixed results is that both Bain and Demsetz are right,
but the relative importance of the mechanisms they stress varies
considerably across the economy.
A number of studies support the importance of further research at the
firm and business unit levels. Schmalensee (1985) found that the intra-
industry variation in business unit profit rates considerably exceeds the
inter-industry variation and that knowledge of a firm's profitability in one
of its lines of business does not in general help predict how well its other
businesses will do. Later work by Mueller (1986) and Cubbin and Geroski
(1987) suggests that the performance of individual firms, particularly
market leaders, over time tends to be at most weakly related to average
performance of the markets in which they operate.. Mueller finds that market
shares of leading firms are surprisingly stable over time in many
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industries. All of this says that Demsetz was clearly right in one
important respect: industry averages generally hide a great deal of
interesting intra-industry variation.
Intertemporal Differences If a cross-section of industries is observed
over time, changes in the pattern of inter-industry relations may provide
valuable information. Some recent studies have employed this sort of panel
data, though little use has yet been made of the sophisticated econometric
techniques that have been developed for the analysis of such data.
In a study concerned with the Demsetz (1973) critique, Peltzman (1977)
examined the relation between changes in concentration and changes in price
and productivity. He found that concentration increases tended to be
associated with above-average increases in both price-cost margins and
productivity and (because the productivity effect was stronger) below-
average increases in prices. Later work by Gisser (1984) and others finds
that productivity gains are associated with both substantial increases and
substantial decreases in concentration. These results suggest a generalized
version of Demsetz's world view: innovators gain at the expense of their
rivals, so that concentration is endogenous in the long run, but
concentration may rise or fall depending on whether initially large or small
firms are the innovators.
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986) have constructed an industry-
level panel data set for U.S. manufacturing that covers the 1958-81 period.
Their research reveals, among other things, that the concentration-
profitability correlation fell dramatically in the 1970's and that it moved
pro-cyclically around this trend. In related work, Schmalensee (1987b)
found that the average intra-industry profitability advantage of large firms
III
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over their smaller rivals also declined over this period but that the large-
firm advantage moved counter-cyclically.
To interpret these results, it is useful to us re-write equations (5)
and (6) in somewhat more general form:
(5') ri - p + 6Si (firm level),
(6') r - p + 6H (industry level).
Schmalensee finds in effect that 6 on average declines over time. Equation
(6') indicates that this can explain (in a mechanical sense) the secular
decline in the correlation between concentration and profitability reported
by Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen. But Schmalensee also finds that 6 on
average moves counter-cyclically in (5'), while Domowitz, Hubbard, and
Petersen find the correlation between concentration and profitability to be
pro-cyclical. This suggests that p, which is best interpreted here as the
profit rate earned by small firms, is more strongly pro-cyclical in
concentrated than in unconcentrated industries. This in turn suggests that
the incidence of collusive behavior in concentrated industries, which can be
expected to raise the profits of both small and large firms, may be pro-
cyclical.
Finally, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1987) use a panel data set
constructed by linking information gathered by the U.S. Census of
Manufacturing at five-year intervals at the plant and firm levels. They are
thus able to study a relatively complete record of entry and exit in U.S.
manufacturing industries over time and to distinguish among entry by new
firms, firms that build new plants, and firms that change the product mix of
existing plants. Among their more interesting findings are that both entry
__ _1_____________1___I__·_____ ___
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and exit are frequent events in most U.S. industries and that entry rates
and exit rates are positively correlated in cross-section. It is hard to
come away from their study with the impression that entry deterring behavior
is important in many U.S. manufacturing industries.
6. Conclusions and Implications
Until game-theoretic analysis either begins to yield robust, unambiguous
predictions or is replaced by a mode of theorizing that does so, any major
substantive advances in industrial organization are likely to come from
empirical research. And the recent increase in the volume of high-quality
empirical studies makes it quite possible that industrial organization will
once again become a field driven by facts rather than theories.
The examples discussed in Sections 4 and 5 indicate that well-
designed empirical research can reveal a good deal about how market
structure, conduct, and performance are shaped. But knowledge of many
phenomena is clearly still thin in important respects. One of the few
substantive conclusions that can be confidently asserted at this stage is
that while market concentration may indeed have some impact on conduct and
performance, it is much less important than Bain and some of his early
followers seem to have believed. It seems unlikely that any very simple
model of business behavior will prove empirically robust.
It is important to note that virtually all of the persuasive empirical
studies discussed here share one important feature: they employ carefully-
constructed data sets. Because few real data sets confess their secrets
easily, advances in modeling techniques and econometric methods are
important. But the main lesson that seems to emerge from recent
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developments in empirical research in industrial organization is that the
quality of the results obtained depends critically on the quality of the
data employed. The key dimension of quality has more to do with
experimental design than with measurement error; what matters most is
whether the data contain information that can be used to identify the
answers to questions of economic interest.
This is in some respects a discouraging conclusion. Economists, unlike
historians or anthropologists, are formally trained only in the analysis of
data sets, not in their construction. The economics profession does not
much reward the tedious labor necessary to construct sound and interesting
data sets. And data set construction is particularly difficult in
industrial organization, and not only because accounting data are imperfect.
Large modern firms are complex collections of business units operating in
different markets, each with a whole array of tangible and intangible assets
and employing a large number of workers and managers, linked by top
executives and their staffs. Business firms typically produce large
quantities of data to guide their own decisions, but they are almost
universally reluctant to make much of this information public. The labor
economist's task of describing workers and their behavior seem to pale
beside the difficulties inherent in constructing data sets on firms and
their decisions and operations.
The economics profession seems unlikely dramatically to change its
collective attitude toward data collection any time soon. Thus progress in
industrial organization may depend critically on the extent to which the
construction of informative data sets is supported by government agencies
and other sources of research financing.
-_111__
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-FOOTNOTES
1. Perhaps the clearest examples of adherents of the two Schools shouting
past each other can be found in Goldschmid, Mann, and Weston (1974).
2. Tirole (1988) provides a superb general overview of the theoretical
literature in industrial organization.
3. I thus resist the temptation to discuss the emerging literature on
laboratory experiments in industrial organization; see Plott (1988) for
a comprehensive survey.
4. This paragraph and the next have been heavily influenced by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1987) and Milgrom and Roberts (1987).
5. An earlier study by Cox (1933) is much less informative - largely, I
think, because Cox did not have available the antitrust trial record on
which Tennant and Nicholls relied heavily.
6. This pattern of conduct persisted after World War II, and product
innovation became an important form of non-price rivalry. See
Schmalensee (1972, pp. 125-133) for a brief discussion of the early
postwar period.
7. A number of the points made in the remainder of this section and in
Section 5 are discussed in more detail and with more complete
references to the literature in Schmalensee (1988).
8. This is basically why studies of the aggregate welfare costs of
monopoly power that follow Harberger (1954) and base their analysis on
differences in profit rates tend to find small costs.
9. This number was derived from U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics
of Income for 1938, the middle year in Bain's sample.
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10. Tests of interactive specifications were performed by a few later
authors (e.g., Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980) and Salinger (1984))
and produced generally negative results.
11. This development follows Schmalensee (1987a); see also Cowling and
Waterson (1976) and Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984).
12. See Schmalensee (1987a) for a discussion of more complex cases.
13. But see Salinger (1984) for an interesting attempt and some striking
results.
14. See Bresnahan (1988) for a comprehensive and useful survey of this
work.
15. Hall (1987) in fact works with a general neoclassical production
function with multiple inputs, but his analysis is quite similar to
that which follows.
16. See Caves (1988) for a comprehensive and stimulating survey of research
of this general sort.
17. Porter (1979) argued that his results did not imply that Demsetz was
right but were rather more consistent with the existence of important
strategic groups within industries and with mobility barriers that
prevented movement into the more profitable groups.
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